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Abstract
Recent research suggests that there is substantial public support (includingwillingness to pay) for
forest conservation. Based on a nationwide survey experiment in Brazil (N=2500) the largest and
richest of theworld’s tropical developing countries, we shed new light on this issue. Towhat extent
does the public in fact support forest conservation andwhat factors are inﬂuencing support levels?
Unlike previous studies, our results show that thewillingness to pay for tropical forest conservation in
Brazil is rather low.Moreover, framing forest conservation in terms of biodiversity protection, which
tends to createmore local beneﬁts, does not inducemore support than framing conservation in terms
ofmitigating global climate change. The results also show that low levels of trust in public institutions
have a strong negative impact on the public’s willingness to pay for forest conservation, individually
and/or via government spending.What could other (richer) countries do, in this context, to
encourage forest conservation in Brazil and other tropical developing countries? One key issue is
whether prospects of foreign funding for forest conservation are likely to crowd out or, conversely,
enhance themotivation for domestic level conservation efforts.Weﬁnd that prospects of foreign
funding have no signiﬁcant effect onwillingness to pay for forest conservation. Theseﬁndings have at
least three policy implications, namely, that the Brazilian public’s willingness to pay for forest
conservation is very limited, that large-scale international funding is probably needed, and that such
funding is unlikely to encouragemore domestic effort, but is also unlikely to crowd out domestic
efforts. Restoring public trust in the Brazilian government is key to increasing public support for forest
conservation in Brazil.
1. Introduction
Deforestation in tropical developing countries
accounts for around 6%–17%of global anthropogenic
CO2 emissions. In 2000–2010, an estimated
1.0 PgC yr−1, out of a total of 228.7 PgC stored in
tropical woody vegetation, were emitted due to
deforestation. Brazil and Indonesia, which account for
around 35% of total carbon stored in tropical forests
globally, are responsible for the largest emissions from
tropical deforestation (Baccini et al 2012).
Existing research suggests that progress towards
reducing deforestation is possible (Assunção
et al 2013, Hargrave and Kis-Katos 2013, Held
et al 2013, Nolte et al 2013, Viola 2013). For instance,
legislative and enforcement efforts appear to have lead
to a drop in Brazil’s deforestation rates (Lapola
et al 2014). Moreover, public opinion, which sets
important constraints on what policy-makers can do
in democratic societies (Geels 2013, Patt and
Weber 2013, Wiseman et al 2013, Gebara et al 2014),
such as Brazil and Indonesia, appears quite favorably
disposed towards climate policy and forest conserva-
tion. For example, the PEW Global Attitudes Surveys
(Pew Research Center 2015) indicate that 86% of Bra-
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serious problem, and 88% supported limiting green-
house gas (GHG) emissions as part of an international
agreement, with only 9% opposed. 89% of the Brazi-
lian respondents agreed that major changes in lifestyle
are needed, whereas only 10% think that technology
could solve the problem without requiring major
changes.
With regards to forest conservation more speciﬁ-
cally, a 2010 World Bank survey asked ‘Would you
favor or oppose [Brazil] taking each of the following
steps to help deal with climate change? [K] Preserving
or expanding forested areas, even if this means less
land for agriculture or construction.’ 68% of the
respondents were in favor and 23% were opposed.
Moreover, a recent study by Vincent et al (2014) of
upper-middle-income countries, which account for
around 80% of tropical primary forests, concludes,
‘that protective government policies have lagged
behind the increase in public demand in these coun-
triesK’ In a case study from Malaysia, they also show
that rising household income is associated with an
increased willingness to pay for forest conservation.
Their main conclusion is that domestic funding in
(upper-middle-income) tropical countries can play a
larger role in (i) closing the funding gap for tropical
forest conservation, and (ii) paying for supplementary
conservation actions linked to international payments
for reduced GHG emissions from deforestation and
forest degradation in tropical countries.
We agree with these studies that public support for
climate policy and forest conservationmore speciﬁcally
is crucial, but we remain somewhat sceptical about
observed high levels of public support for GHGmitiga-
tion measures and forest conservation, notably in view
ofmajor economicdifﬁculties inmost tropical develop-
ing countries. We employ a composite measure of
willingness to pay that consists not only of stated pre-
ferences concerning climate-change mitigation, but
also captures people’s intention to pay for it when there
is a potential of foreign ﬁnancial support. To shedmore
light on this issue we carried out a representative survey
in Brazil (N=2500), the largest and richest tropical
developing country, where previous research suggests
strong public support for forest conservation (World
Bank 2010, Vincent et al 2014, Pew Research
Center 2015).
2.Willingness to pay for forest
conservation
Our research has two objectives:
(1) to ﬁnd out whether public support, and willingness
to pay for forest conservation more speciﬁcally,
remains as high as suggested in previous research
when respondents are made aware of cost implica-
tions, and given the economic and political pro-
blems Brazil is facing;
(2) toﬁnd outwhat the implications for public support
and willingness to pay are of framing forest
conservation as biodiversity conservation or cli-
mate change mitigation, and how varying pro-
spects of foreign ﬁnancial support for forest
conservation could affect citizens’ support and
willingness to pay.
The Brazilian authorities and residents of Brazil do
favor forest conservation and the issue also receives
large media attention (e.g., Verchot 2015, Batty 2016,
Plumer 2016). Preserving forests does not only impact
on clean air, safe drinking water, fewer droughts or
ﬂoods but also the survival of the species depends
upon a healthy forest ecosystem (Nunes et al 2012,
Viola 2013). That said, there is limited knowledge on
the extent to which such beneﬁts are likely to
materialize, and what the costs of forest conservation
are likely to be. We anticipate though rather limited
public support for forest conservation when respon-
dents are made aware of relevant cost implications,
notably under negative economic conditions in Brazil.
Existing research suggests that public support for
climate change mitigation—more broadly deﬁned—
tends to drop with increasing costs of such policies to
individual citizens (ego-tropic effect) and to countries
as a whole (socio-tropic effect) (Bernauer and Böh-
melt 2013). Moreover, it suggests that public support
for climate change mitigation, and environmental
protection more generally, tends to become stronger
when the economy is doing well, and tends to weaken
during economic recession (Scruggs andBenegal 2012,
Bechtel and Scheve 2013, Kachi et al 2015). In other
words, compared to the existing evidence on public
support for forest conservation in Brazil, which stems
from economically better times, we expect to ﬁnd a
rather limited willingness to pay for forest conserva-
tion, particularly when citizens are made aware of the
cost implications of such policies.
Regarding the second objective, we address two
arguments that play an important role in the interna-
tional debate on tropical forest conservation, but
remain insufﬁciently substantiated empirically.
The ﬁrst argument holds that framing forest con-
servation as a biodiversity conservation issue may eli-
cit more public support, compared to framing forest
conservation as a contribution to global climate
change mitigation efforts. The logic is straightforward
and backed by economic theories of public goods pro-
vision (Barrett 2003, Ostrom 2015). Even though bio-
diversity conservation is oftentimes presented as a
global issue, its speciﬁc beneﬁts are primarily local
(Bernauer 2013, Schoenefeld and McCauley 2015,
Hine et al 2016). This means that the beneﬁts from
greater forest conservation accrue primarily to people
and collective entities within Brazil. Conversely, fram-
ing forest conservation as a global climate change pol-
icy issue, in terms of preventing the loss of carbon
sinks, is likely to elicit less support. Assuming that
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most people tend to put their country and its citizens
ﬁrst, and that they are relatively myopic in terms of
when the beneﬁts of a policy should preferablymateri-
alize, we anticipate biodiversity conservation to be
more popular than contributing to the mitigation of
global climate change.
The second argument builds on a large literature
on development assistance, and on recent debates
about the pros and cons of foreign funding for forest
conservation (Alesina and Dollar 2002, Easterly 2006,
Jacobsen and Hanley 2009, Wright and Winters 2010,
Asner 2011, Lindhjem and Tuan 2012, Van de
Sijpe 2013,Waldron et al 2013). It also takes account of
the fact that international funding has paid an impor-
tant role in debates over forest conservation in tropical
developing countries, both in the climate change and
biodiversity context (Viola 2013, Held et al 2013).
Some scholars argue that increased foreign funding
will motivate increased, i.e., additional, domestic
spending on forest conservation, Yet others believe
that good prospects of foreign funding may weaken
support among stakeholders and the general public for
more domestic investment into sustainable develop-
ment, including forest conservation (Chao and
Yu 1999, Burnside and Dollar 2000, Sachs 2005). The
latter expectation is based on the fact that money is
fungible, and that there will always be competing soci-
etal needs, above all in poor countries. In other words,
increased inﬂows of foreign funding allow for diver-
sion of existing domestic funding for forest conserva-
tion to other policy-areas where there is strong public
pressure for increased public spending (e.g., social
welfare). This potential negative effect seems particu-
larly likely under conditions of economic duress, from
which Brazil is suffering.
3. Study design
We ﬁelded a survey-embedded experiment in Brazil to
ﬁnd out how strong public support for forest con-
servation is, and how biodiversity or climate change
framing, as well as prospects of foreign funding affect
willingness to pay. The survey was designed by the
authors. YouGov ﬁelded the survey with the support
of a local partner in Brazil (Netquest). 3223 Brazilian
residents were interviewed. That sample was matched
down to a sample of 2500 to produce the ﬁnal dataset.
We employed a sampling frame on the indicators of
gender, age, geographic region, education, and exper-
imental group (treatments). For instance, only adults
above 18 years old were interviewed. In addition,
YouGov balanced the sample according to gender, age,
and education to match the characteristics of the
population. The frame was constructed by stratiﬁed
sampling from the full 2014 Americas Barometer from
the Latin American Opinion project at Vanderbilt
University, with selection within strata by weighted
sampling with replacement. The matched cases were
weighted to the sampling frame using propensity
scores. The matched cases and the frame were
combined and a logistic regression was estimated for
inclusion in the frame. The propensity score function
included age, gender, region, years of education, and
frequency of Internet usage. The propensity scores
were grouped into deciles of the estimated propensity
score in the frame and post-stratiﬁed according to
these deciles. The ﬁnal weights were post-stratiﬁed to
match the distribution of the sampling frame on age,
gender, and a three-category education indicator. (see
SI-1 for details on these indicators, ﬁgure SI-1, and
table SI-1 for demographics).
After some introductory text, participants were
randomly assigned to pieces of information that pre-
sented forest conservation either in terms of an effort
to protect biodiversity in Brazil, or an effort tomitigate
GHG emissions and thus contribute to global climate
change mitigation efforts, and pieces of information
that primed survey participants for either good or bad
prospects of Brazil receiving foreign ﬁnancial assis-
tance for forest conservation. The control group
received no information. Comprehension checks
items were used to make sure participants read and
understood the treatment texts (see SI-2 for details).
After exposure to this information, which resulted
in eight treatment groups and one control group
(ﬁgure SI-2), participants responded to a series of
questions about preferences with respect to forest con-
servation, our principal outcome variable. In the
experimental part of the study, we used six of these
survey items to construct a composite willingness to
pay measure. Finally, participants responded to var-
ious items concerning environmental and political
attitudes as well as socio-demographics (see SI-3 for
survey items and SI-4 for the willingness to pay
measurement).
4. Results
To start with, we observe very strong public support
for climate policy and forest conservation in Brazil
when gauging such support with questions that do
not, or only to a minor degree, refer to cost implica-
tions (table 1). This evidence lines up well with
previous surveys using similar items (World
Bank 2010, Vincent et al 2014, Pew Research Cen-
ter 2015). Importantly, compared to previous surveys,
it does not seem to have dropped despite the fact that
Brazil ﬁnds itself in a major economic and political
crisis.
Moreover, levels of support for unconditional cli-
mate policy and forest conservation are also very high
(table 2). More than 80% of the respondents support
unconditional (i.e., non-reciprocal) reductions of CO2
as well as forest conservation in Brazil. This is quite
surprising because the majority of respondents also
believes that: (a) rich countries should do more than
3
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poor countries to reduce their GHG emissions
(73.8%); (b) forest conservation beneﬁts primarily the
world, rather than Brazil (68.96%); and (c) Brazil
receives too little international funding for forest con-
servation (68.16%) (table SI-3 for detailed item word-
ings). From a purely economic viewpoint, such high
levels of support for unconditional forest conservation
would make sense if respondents expected the largest
part of the beneﬁts to materialize within Brazil. How-
ever, high local WTP for forest conservation might
also result from a situation where individuals view the
prospects of international support as gloomy. Given
that respondents expect forest conservation in Brazil
to beneﬁt primarily the world, we expected less sup-
port for unconditional CO2 reduction and forest con-
servation. Our ﬁndings do not support this
expectation (table 1). However, such ﬁndingsmight be
due, at least to some extent, to social desirability bias,
i.e., a prevailing social norm that forest conservation
and CO2 reductions are desirable and respondents
thus react in ways they believe are expected by the sur-
vey team, or society.
When we gauge support for forest conservation in
Brazil by using measures that clearly associate such
efforts with costs, support drops quite dramatically
(table 3). Only when we use measures that refer to cost
implications in terms that are not easily quantiﬁable
for individual respondents (e.g., raise taxes, accept a
reduction of government spending in other policy
areas) we still observe rather high (but reduced, com-
pared to table 1) levels of support. This ﬁnding is plau-
sible because the latter items leave respondents
somewhat in the dark as to what the exact ﬁnancial
consequences of more forest conservation would be
for them personally. As soon as we use items that
quantify the personal ﬁnancial consequences we
observe a strong drop in support for forest conserva-
tion. Moreover, we included a lottery in the survey,
asking participants, in case of winning, whether they
prefer to receive the prize of 78BRL or donate this
money to an ENGO. Most respondents decided to
keep the lottery win (55.84%) rather than donate it to
an environmental organization engaged in forest con-
servation (44.16%). Large majorities were also
opposed to raising taxes (60.92%) or contributing to
non-governmental organizations (70.48) in support of
forest conservation (table SI-4). In summary, we ﬁnd
that the Brazilian’s willingness to pay for forest con-
servation is quite limited, and perhaps more limited
than previous studies have suggested (e.g., Vincent
et al 2014).
We now move to the experimental parts embed-
ded in the survey. Survey participants were randomly
assigned to pieces of information framing forest con-
servation in climate change mitigation (preserving
carbon sinks and reducing GHG emissions) or biodi-
versity protection terms, and information concerning
good or poor prospects of Brazil obtaining foreign
ﬁnancial support for forest conservation (see SI-2 for
details). Including control groups, this resulted in a
3×3 design, i.e., nine groups, with group sizes ran-
ging from N=255 to N=299. Both environmental
issues; biodiversity and climate change, were framed as
forest conservation, and thus, climate protection.
We examined the effects of these treatments on a
composite measure of willingness to pay for forest
conservation, constructed from six of the items shown
in table 3 (see SI-4) and using conﬁrmatory factor ana-
lysis (table SI-6). As noted above, we think that these
Table 1.General support for climate policy and forest conservation.
Survey items Support No support
Government pledge to reduceCO2 93.36 6.64
Change lifestyle to protect climate 71.96 28.04
Climate change harm to people in Brazil 95.56 4.44
Expected personal climate change harm 94.48 5.52
Government not doing enough against
deforestation
85.52 14.44
Notes: To facilitate visual interpretation of the data, we recoded the
responses to ﬁt a binary scale, with support for climate policy and
forest conservation coded as 1 (0 otherwise). The support category
(1) thus comprises ‘support’ and ‘strong support’ and the non-
support category (0) includes ‘oppose’ and ‘strong oppose’ answers.
N=2500. See also ﬁgure SI-3 and table SI-2 for detailed item
wordings.
Table 2.Unconditional versus reciprocal climate policy and forest conservation.
Survey items Support in%
Support for unconditional CO2 reduction 81.12
Support for conditional CO2 reduction 18.88
Developing countries should reduce asmuchCO2 25.56
Richer countries should reducemoreCO2 73.8
Forest conservation in Brazil beneﬁts primarily Brazil 29.56
Theworld 68.96
None of the above 1.48
Support for forest conservation in BrazilK Regardless of whether other countries provide funding 84.44
Only if other countries provide funding 11.2
No forest conservation 4.36
Notes:N=2500. See table SI-3 for detailed itemwordings.
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measures are closer approximations of individual’s
‘true’willingness to pay for forest conservation in Bra-
zil, relative to measures that do not include cost
implications.
The results are based onmultiple regression analy-
sis, in which assignments to treatment groups are
included as explanatory variables, alongside a range of
control variables (e.g., socio-demographic variables,
political ideology, trust in government, region of resi-
dence) (see also SI-5). Figure 1 illustrates that younger
participants are more willing to pay for forest con-
servation. Generally, individuals with conservative
political ideology tend to be less willing to pay for
environmental policies (Nisbet et al 2015). Along these
lines, we ﬁnd that left-leaning individuals in Brazil are
more willing to pay for climate change mitigation and
forest conservation policies. Also, we ﬁnd that will-
ingness to pay increases with trust in government
(Corbett and Durfee 2004, Hmielowski et al 2014).
Individuals who consider deforestation a serious pro-
blem in Brazil are more willing to pay for forest con-
servation policies (Jamieson and Waldman 2003,
Kellstedt et al 2008). Gender, education, income, and
knowledge as well as most of the geographic (region)
variables have no signiﬁcant effects. Different types of
ecosystems characterize Brazil and people from differ-
ent regions may thus hold different perceptions and
preferences concerning deforestation and climate
change mitigation. For example, residents of the
Northeast region, which experiences more droughts,
are more willing to pay for forest conservation,
although they exhibit lower GDP per capita levels
(UOL Economia 2013). We ﬁnd that respondents
from the south, which includes large cities, are less
willing to pay, perhaps because they are less directly
affected by deforestation.
It turns out that the experimental evidence does
not support the expectations stated above. Figure 2
illustrates that both the climate change and biodi-
versity framing have a positive and signiﬁcant, but very
small effect onwillingness to pay. The effect of the bio-
diversity frame is somewhat stronger, but not sig-
niﬁcantly different from the effect of the climate
change frame. Thus, any framing increases willingness
to pay for forest conservation, though the effects are
very small. The prospects of foreign funding do not
Table 3.Willingness to pay for forest conservation in Brazil.
Survey items Highwillingness to pay Lowwillingness to pay
Raise taxes 39.08 60.92
Accept less land use 79.16 20.84
Reduce other spending 74.24 25.76
Pay additional R$30 tax 37.68 62.32
PayR$100 to ENGO 29.52 70.48
Paymore for forest prod. 68.44 31.56
Keep/donate lottery win 44.16 55.84
Notes: To facilitate visual interpretation of the data, we recoded the responses to ﬁt a binary scale with willingness to pay for climate policy
and forest conservation coded as 1 (0 otherwise). The high willingness to pay category (1) thus comprises ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ and the
low willingness to pay category (0) includes ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘disagree’ answers. N=2500. See also ﬁgure SI-3 and table SI-4 for
detailed itemwordings.
Figure 1.Marginal effects of control variables. Notes: point estimates pertain tomarginal effects; horizontal bars denote 95%
conﬁdence intervals. Solid vertical line (red)marksmarginal effect of 0. See table SI-8 for detailed itemwording.
5
Environ. Res. Lett. 11 (2016) 114001
Figure 2.Effects of funding prospects and biodiversity/climate changemitigation framing. Notes: percentage points denotemean
differences between treatments and control groups.Where whiskers cross the 0-red line the estimated treatment effect is not
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The composite willingness to paymeasure (response variable) is scaled from0 to 1, so that
differences inmeans can be read as percentage-points in willingness to pay (see SI-5 for a detailed analysis).
Figure 3.Moderating effect of trust. Notes: solid lines indicatemarginal effects for control and treatment group, respectively; dashed
lines indicate 90% conﬁdence intervals. The itemused for these estimates is: ‘if the Brazilian government hadmore funding for forest
conservation, do you think it wouldmake good use of this funding, in the sense of effectivemeasures for forest conservation in Brazil?’
(table SI-5).
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seem to matter at all. This result lines up with the
aforementioned ﬁnding that there is very strong sup-
port for unconditional forest conservation (see
table 1). Combinations of the two types of treatment
conditions have positive effects on willingness to pay,
but these effects are small and appear to be driven
more by the climate change/biodiversity, rather than
theﬁnancial support prospects treatment.
In view of high levels of corruption and other
inadequacies of government in Brazil, a key element
appears to be the trust in public institutions. When
asked to assess the statement ‘I trust the federal gov-
ernment to do what is right’, only 27.6% agreed, while
70.52% disagreed. When asked ‘If the Brazilian gov-
ernment hadmore funding for forest conservation, do
you think it would make good use of this funding, in
the sense of effective measures for forest conservation
in Brazil?’ 9.6% answered Yes, 48.4% ‘to some extent’,
and 41.9% answered No. Trust in domestic and inter-
national non-governmental environmental groups
making better use of funding turned out to be much
higher. Only 7.3% and 8.2% respectively said No.
Also, 82% of the respondents agreed with the state-
ment ‘I am suspicious of the federal government.’
The existing literature shows that citizens who
trust public institutions tend to be more willing to pay
for new policies because they anticipate effective
implementation (Brefﬂe et al 2015, Jones et al 2015).
The results displayed in ﬁgure 3 (Model 1 in table SI-7)
support this argument. Individuals who do not trust
the government exhibit lower willingness to pay for
forest conservation. Untreated respondents exhibit
slightly lower willingness to pay than treated respon-
dents (aggregate effect of treatment groups) at low to
mid-sized levels of trust. We infer from this result that
public trust in the Brazilian governmentmattersmuch
more for willingness to pay for forest conservation,
compared to whether forest protection is framed as a
climate change mitigation or biodiversity protection
issue, or whether the prospects of foreign ﬁnancial
support for forest protection are good or bad (see SI-6
for additionalmoderating effects).
5. Conclusion
Overall, we ﬁnd that public support for forest con-
servation drops substantially when we move from
measuring stated preferences in a more general form
to survey measures including speciﬁc willingness to
pay elements. This means that the public in tropical
developing countries, such as Brazil, may not be
willing to support (and pay for) forest conservation
measures at the same levels that other surveys on the
issue have suggested. There is a lot of discussion in
Brazil and elsewhere on the links of deforestation with
different economic sectors, i.e., agriculture (e.g.,
Assunca̧õ et al 2013, Strassburg et al 2014). Further
research could look more systematically into the costs
and beneﬁts of deforestation with respect to agricul-
ture, and their effects on public opinion. By treating
respondents with a more detailed depiction of costs
and beneﬁts, support for forest conservation might in
fact change among the general population. Regarding
the framing of our experiments, further research could
also refer to more speciﬁc consequences of deforesta-
tion e.g., droughts. Additional studies could investi-
gate other large tropical developing countries, most
notably Indonesia and the Democratic Republic of
Congo, along similar lines to ﬁnd out whether our
results uphold in countries that are poorer than Brazil
but have not experienced a recent and very rapid onset
of economic and political crisis. Whether chronically
higher levels of poverty have a more negative effect on
public support for forest conservation than rapid
economic downturns starting out from lower levels of
poverty remains open, however.
Finding that the willingness to pay for forest con-
servation in Brazil is rather low, it is important to learn
more about what could be done to foster domestic sup-
port for forest conservation, both in Brazil and other
tropical developing countries. Framing forest conserva-
tion in biodiversity rather than climate change mitiga-
tion terms does not seem to make a signiﬁcant
difference. Moreover, despite the fact that most Brazi-
lians think that other countries are not providing
enough funding to Brazil for forest conservation, for-
eign funding prospects do not make a difference either.
The negative news here is that more foreign funding
may not help leveragemore domestic level funding. The
positive news is, however, that prospects of increased
foreign funding seem unlikely to crowd out public sup-
port for domestic funding for forest conservation.
Finally, as Brazil is undergoing an acute political
and economic crisis at the same time, it appears that
re-establishing trust in public institutions will be cru-
cial to increasing public support for forest conserva-
tion and also to mobilizing more foreign funding for
that purpose.
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